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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE JURY DID NOT FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE IN AWARDING ONLY
$3,237,00 IN SPECIAL DAMAGES,
A.

Background

The only evidence of medical costs was that Balderas incurred medical expenses of
$4,699.00 to treat his injuries. There was no evidence that the reasonable and necessary cost
to treat Balderas was any amount other than $4,699.00. Dr. Jeffery Chung ("Chung"), Starks'
independent medical examiner, agreed that Balderas was injured in the January accident, and
that he reached maximum medical improvement on April 3, 2001, because of Dr. Iran's
treatment. There was no evidence that any of the treatment received by Balderas was
unnecessary, or that the amounts charged were unreasonable.
Nowhere in the trial record is the sum of $3,237.00 mentioned. It is a mystery how the
jury came up with this number. There is certainly no evidence in the exhibits, in the testimony
of Dr. Tran, or in the testimony of Dr. Chung, which would support a finding that the cost of
medical care for injuries received in the January collision was $3,237.00.
B.

Argument

The parties agree that this court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the
verdict. The verdict should not be reversed due to insufficient evidence, unless the evidence
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presented at trial is so lacking that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion
that was reached by the jury. Balderas' position is that reversal is required in this case
because there was absolutely no evidentiary basis upon which an award less than $4,699.00
for Balderas'medical treatment could be based.
The jury may not disregard the presented evidence and make an award that has no basis
in the evidence presented at trial. A jury's award can only be sustained if there is an
evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730,732 (Utah 1982).
In this case, both the treating physician and the defendant's IME doctor, Dr. Chung, agreed
that Balderas had in fact been injured in the January collision. They also agreed that Balderas
needed treatment until April 3, 2001, to bring him to the condition he occupied prior to the
collision. There was no contrary evidence. There was no dispute that the reasonable cost of
treatment through April 3,2001, was $,699.00. There is no competent evidence in the record
upon which a jury could find that the reasonable and necessary cost of treatment through April
3, 2001, was less than the $,699.00. Moreover, there was no evidence that any portion of
Balderas' treatment through April 3, 2001, was unreasonable or unnecessary.
There must be competent evidence to support a verdict. Time Commercial Financing
Corp. v. Davis, 657 P.2d 1284,1287 (Utah 1982). The jury cannot simply disregard the only
evidence on an issue and make a finding which is contrary to the undisputed evidence.
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985); Batty v.
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Mitchell 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 197 S);Nelson v. Trujillo, supra; Time Commercial
Financing Corp. v. Davis, supra.
The jury in this case found that Starks was negligent in colliding with the Balderas
vehicle. It found that Balderas was injured in the collision. The jury determined that Balderas
was entitled to recover for medical care caused by the accident. The jury specifically found
that injuries which Balderas suffered in the accident were caused by the negligence of Starks.
However, having made these findings, the jury then arbitrarily reduced the amount of
special damages to $3,237.00. From this verdict, it is impossible to tell if anything was
included in the amount awarded for travel costs necessary to receive medical treatment, which
were testified to be approximately $387.60.
Once the jury has decided that Starks was negligent, and that his negligence was a
proximate cause of Balderas' injuries, it cannot then disregard the only evidence offered on
the nature and extent of the injuries, the amount of treatment necessary to resolve the injuries,
and the cost of such treatment. There was no evidence in the record from which the jury could
make a finding that the medical expenses and other damages suffered by Balderas as a result
of the negligence of Starks was the sum of $3,237.00.
Starks argues that Balderas has not marshaled the evidence on this point, and therefore
he cannot be heard to complain that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. See
Brief of Appellee at 28-29. This claim has no merit.
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Balderas marshaled the evidence on the cost of treatment for his injuries in his opening
brief Statement of Facts at pages 6-9, and in his argument at pages 34-35. The marshaled
evidence was the only evidence presented to the jury on the nature and extent of Balderas5
injuries from the collision.
The marshaled evidence showed that on his first visit to Dr. Tran, Balderas complained
mainly of neck and back pain. Dr. Tran treated Balderas for injuries received in the collision
from January 6 through April 3, 2001. Dr. Tran admitted that Balderas had a pre-existing
impairment to his neck, but he testified that the January 1, 2001, accident exacerbated the
preexisting neck impairment and that the treatment through April 3, 2001, was necessary to
return Balderas to his pre-injury status. He testified that Balderas reached maximum medical
improvement for his injuries on April 3, 2001. Dr. Tran testified that he charged $4,699.00
to treat Balderas from January 6 through April 3, 2001 and he testified that the sum of
$4,699.00 was a fair and reasonable charge for the medical services he rendered.
Starks hired Dr. Jeffrey Chung, an independent medical examiner, to examine Balderas
and opine as to whether he had been injured in the January 2001 collision, and to opine on the
nature and extent of his injuries. Dr. Chung examined Balderas and appeared at trial to
testify. Dr. Chung agreed that Balderas had been injured in the collision and that he reached
maximum medical improvement for the injuries received in the January collision on April 3,
2001. Dr. Chung gave no testimony to contradict or dispute the testimony of Dr. Tran.

4

No other witness testified at trial regarding Balderas' injuries. No witness testified that
Balderas was not injured or that he reached maximum medical improvement for the January
injuries at any time prior to April 3, 2001. No witness testified at trial that any treatment
received from Dr. Tran was not necessary to treat Balderas' injuries, or that any amount other
than $4,699.00 was the fair and reasonable cost for the medical treatments received by
Balderas for his injuries in the January 1, 2001 accident.
The only evidence upon which the jury could rely in determining the amount of special
damage for medical costs suffered by Balderas was the testimony of Dr. Tran, Dr. Chung, and
the medical records and billings of Dr. Tran. The only evidence on the mileage costs
necessary to receive medical treatment was the testimony of Balderas.
There was no evidence in the case that Balderas' treatment costs were other than
$,699.00, or that Balderas had recovered from his injuries at any date prior to April 3, 2001.
Starks claims the evidence supporting the verdict has not been marshaled. However,
it is impossible to marshal evidence that does not exist. There is no evidence anywhere in the
record which would support a finding that the cost of medical treatment for Balderas' injuries
was any amount other than $,699.00. Incredibly, counsel argues at pages 30-31 of his Brief
that the jury could reduce the amount of medical expenses based upon the fact that counsel
argued that because Balderas went back to work before the doctor released him, he must have
been better. Such arguments are not evidence, and the jury could not properly rely upon
argument to reduce the damage claim. The jury is not at liberty to ignore the evidence and
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reduce the amount of special damages simply because counsel in argument tells them they can
do so. If the jury believes the cost of medical care was less than $,699.00, they must be able
to base such a belief on evidence submitted to them, not on the arguments of counsel. Starks
presented no "evidence" at trial which supports an award of special damages in the amount
of $3,237.00.
While it is true that a jury must weigh conflicting evidence, the jury is not free to
disregard the only evidence presented on a damage issue, and reach a conclusion that is
contrary to that evidence. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., supra; Batty v.
Mitchell, supra; Nelson v. Trujillo, supra; Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis,
supra. Absent an evidentiary basis for awarding less than the $4,699.00 testified to by Dr„
Tran, the jury cannot be allowed to speculate that some arbitrary amount less than $4,699.00
is the actual amount of damage suffered by Balderas. Id.
Because the special damages verdict in this case could only have been based on
speculation, prejudice or passion, a new trial or an additur should have been granted by the
trial court. Taken together, the lowering of the special damage award and the refusal to award
general damages shows the jury acted out of prejudice and passion. Therefore, the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied Balderas5 motion for a new trial. U.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). Id.
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Point II
THE FAILURE TO MAKE A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IS NOT
FATAL TO Balderas' ARGUMENT ON SPECIAL DAMAGES
A.

Introduction

Starks argues at page 24 of his brief that Balderas has waived his claim of insufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict by not making a motion for a directed verdict.
Starks apparently misunderstands Balderas5 argument on this issue. Balderas is not
claiming that as a matter of law he was entitled to recover and that a motion for directed
verdict was appropriate at the close of his evidence.
The jury was given the task of determining the factual issues of whether Starks was
negligent and whether the negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
Balderas. Damages do not become an issue until these factual questions have been decided
by the jury.
However, once the jury decides that Balderas was injured by Starks, and that the
negligence of Starks was a proximate cause of injury to Balderas, the jury cannot then ignore
the only evidence before them as to the extent of the injury, and the cost of its treatment, and
award some arbitrary amount as special damages. Because Balderas' special damages claim
included not only medical costs, but also a claim for mileage reimbursement, there were facts
to be determined by the jury and a special verdict on the amount of special damages would
not have been appropriate.
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B.

Argument

Starks errs in arguing that the holding in Henderson v. Myer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah
1975) prevents Balderas from claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict. Starks admits that a motion for a directed verdict would have been improper in this
case citing Onyeabor v. Pro-Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). Balderas agrees.
Such a motion was not appropriate in this case.
Starks' argument that Balderas cannot claim insufficiency of the evidence as a basis
for overturning the verdict must fail for the reasons set forth herein and in Balderas' opening
brief. A verdict must be based upon evidence in the case, not speculation, conjecture, or
arguments of counsel. In Henderson, the Court noted exceptions to the general rule stated
therein, including the need to prevent injustice. It would certainly be an injustice to affirm
a jury verdict which is not based upon evidence in the case. In fact, a jury verdict which has
no basis in evidence cannot be sustained. Nelson v. Trujillo, supra.
The failure to make a motion for a directed verdict does not prevent this court from
considering that issue. Until the questions of negligence and proximate cause are answered,
the jury cannot address the fact of injury and its damage amount. The jury does not reach the
amount of damage until the questions of proximate cause are answered. Thus, a motion for
directed verdict is not appropriate where a jury must decide these issues.
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Point III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY
OF PAUL FRANCE WITHOUT A PROPER FOUNDATION,
The trial court abused its discretion by not considering Balderas' argument that the
technique (methodology) used by Dr. France to reach the conclusions to which he testified
regarding impact speed in this case are in fact novel, untested, unreliable, and have been
rejected as unreliable by the only court in the United States which has considered this
specific issue. See Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va 151, 475 S.E. 2d 261 (1996). Balderas
told the trial court in his in limine motion that under the holding in State v. Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the trial court had a duty to assure that the methodology used by Dr.
France was accepted and reliable before Dr. France could be allowed to testify. The trial
court refused to require Starks to produce evidence which would show that the
methodology of Dr. France was reliable before it allowed him to testify.
Citing Alder v. Bear Corporation, 202 UT 115, 61 P.3d 1068, Starks argues that
State v. Rimmasch does not apply in this case. Alder does not preclude application of the
Rimmasch standard in this case. The Alder Court specifically recognized the prior holdings
in State v. Kelly, 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546 and Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638
which held that Rimmasch does apply when there is a plausible claim that the technique
being used by the expert is novel.
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Balderas cited the trial court to the case of Tittsworth v. Robinson, supra, in support
of the proposition that the technique and methodology being used by Dr. France was
untested and unreliable. The Virginia Supreme Court found in Tittsworth that the exact
methodology or technique being used by Dr. France in this case was unreliable. It
reversed the trial court for allowing the jury to hear an expert testify to the same type of
conclusions reached by Dr. France in this case, which conclusions were reached using the
exact methodology described by Dr. France as his methodology in this case. The
Tittsworth holding certainly raises a plausible claim that Dr. France's techniques are novel
and unreliable. Once a plausible claim is made that a novel and untested methodology is
being used by the proposed expert, Rule 702 and Rimmasch, and its progeny, absolutely
require that before the expert is allowed to testify, the trial court must make findings that
the techniques being used by the expert to reach his conclusions are reliable and accepted
in the scientific community as being able to produce accurate results within a reasonable
degree of certainty, and that the results can be replicated on a consistent basis.
The trial court in this case did not require Starks to show that Dr. France's
testimony was based upon a reliable and accepted technique or methodology. Therefore,
the testimony should not have been admitted at trial.
The trial court simply refused to adequately address this issue and require Starks to
show that the methodology being used produced accurate and reliable results. Starks has
refused to acknowledge this as an issue and to address it in his Brief. Starks has not even
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discussed the holding in Tittsworth. Starks simply argues that courts commonly allow
accident ^constructionists to testify at trial. This argument begs the question. The fact
that accident reconstruction is an accepted scientific discipline does not allow a witness
who claims to be an accident reconstructionist to testify to conclusions which are reached
using a methodology which is untested and has never been shown able to produce accurate
or reliable results.
Once counsel makes a plausible claim that the technique or methodology being
used by the expert witness is novel, and not accepted as being able to obtain consistent
reliable results in replicated tests, the court must have a hearing on this issue. The party
proffering the witness must show that the techniques are reliable and accepted in the
scientific community before the witness is allowed to testify.
While the trial court did hold a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to
determine whether it would allow Dr. France to testify to his opinions (R. 141), the trial
court never required Starks to make a showing that the techniques used by Dr. France to
reach his opinions were scientifically sound. In addition, the trial court severely limited
Balderas' efforts to show that the methodology used by Dr. France has never been
accepted as scientifically accurate; that the method has never been peer reviewed; and that
there have never been any scientific studies that support the methodology he used.
Balderas intended to show that the methodology used by Dr. France simply fails to
produce accurate results within any degree of acceptable margin of error. Balderas
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intended to show that, at best, Dr. France was testifying to an educated guess. R.321 at
21-29; 123-127. The Court cut counsel's presentation short, thereby precluding counsel
from offering additional evidence which counsel believes would have established the
following facts:
1. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact
speed and forces generated in the accident has never been tested to establish
that the method produces accurate results.
2. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact
speed and forces generated in the accident has never been tested to establish
a margin of error for the determinations made by this method.
3. The accuracy of the methodology used by Dr. France to reach his
opinions on impact speed and forces generated in the accident has never
been peer reviewed.
4. The methodology used by Dr. France to reach his opinions on impact
speed and forces generated in the accident merely allow Dr. France to give
an "educated guess."
The court terminated counsel's inquiry prematurely (R.321 at 29), and ruled that Dr.
France could give his opinion of the impact speed and the forces generated in the accident,
as well as the statistical probability of an injury in such a accident. The court made this
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ruling without requiring Starks to produce any evidence which would support a claim that
the proposed testimony was accurate, reliable, or relevant.
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Pursuant to Rule 702, U.R.E., a trial judge must "ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." State v. Crosby, 927
P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996); See, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993); State v. Rimmasch, supra; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). The
trial court in this case did not do so. It ignored its responsibility to exclude non-relevant
evidence which has no accepted scientific basis. Id.
Legitimate science consists of methodologies which have been shown by scientific
testing to produce consistent and reliable results. Accepted scientific methodologies have
been tested to ensure they produce consistent and reliable results. Margins of error in the
testing are measured and published. The testing is peer reviewed for accuracy and
reliability. The methodology is reviewed to see if it consistently produces the same results
and to see if the results are consistently replicated. The methodology used by Dr. France is
not legitimate science because it has never been subjected to scientific scrutiny and been
shown to produce reliable results. Tittsworth, supra.
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The trial court failed to require that Starks establish the reliability of Dr. Frances
methodology. The trial court has a duty under Rule 702 to ensure that the scientific
evidence proffered by the defense is inherently reliable. Further, the court must find from
evidence presented at the hearing that any scientific principles and techniques used by the
expert have been properly applied to the specific facts at issue in the case using techniques
which have been shown to produce reliable conclusions which can be replicated, and that
they are not based upon mere speculations or guesses. See, Rimmasch, supra; Crosby,
supra; Brown, supra; Tittsworth, supra.
By failing to ensure that the methodology and technique being used by Dr. France
to reach his conclusions was reliable, the court failed its gatekeeping responsibility as set
forth in Rimmasch.
The trial court erred by allowing Dr. France to give his opinion as to the impact
speed of the collision between the Starks and Balderas vehicles, and then to use that
unsupported opinion to support his opinion about the forces generated in the collision. All
of which was based only on:
1. An examination of photographs of the damaged vehicles;
•

•

'

'

•

*

-

•

*

'

•

•

•

• .

2. Repair estimates; and
3. A speed estimate by Starks.
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During his testimony, Dr. France identified no scientifically accepted principles or
techniques which would allow an expert to correctly determine impact speed by merely
examining a repair estimate and photos of the bumpers of the two cars.
In Tittsworth, the Virginia trial court allowed an expert to estimate impact speed
based upon an examination of photographs and repair estimates without actually
examining the damage to the vehicles. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
such evidence lacked a sufficient foundation and was speculative. The trial court was
reversed.
In this case, the methodology used by Dr. France to determine impact speed and the
resultant change in velocity generated by the impact is identical to the method used by the
expert in Tittsworth. It was not based upon any methodology which is scientifically
accepted for establishing an impact speed with any degree of accuracy. It merely results in
a guess.
The trial court erred in prematurely terminating Balderas' inquiry into the reliability
of Dr. France's methodology. In addition, the court failed to assure the scientific
reliability of Dr. France's opinions by requiring Starks to show the methodology was
capable of producing accurate results. Dr. France's testimony should not have been
allowed. It was unreliable. Rimmasch, supra at 398, n.7. It prejudiced the jury in this
case.
Speculative opinions are simply not admissible. Rimmasch, supra; Tittsworth,
supra; Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.,2001 Utah 77, 31 P.3d 557 (2001).
15

See State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1990) (psychiatrist's testimony
excluded because it relied upon too many unknown facts); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.,
Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989) (expert opinion excluded because based, in part, on
speculation as to facts).
No foundational testimony was ever given that would support the proposition that
an impact speed can be accurately determined based upon the methodology used by Dr.
France in this case. Such unfounded and inherently unreliable opinions do not meet the
requirements of Rule 702 for admission of scientific testimony, as defined in Rimmasch.
They are inadmissable under Rule 702. Rimmasch, supra; Brewer, supra; Tittsworth,
supra. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. France to testify.
POINT IV
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT RELEVANT AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT,
At Point III of his opening brief, Balderas claimed that the Court committed plain error
by admitting the testimony of Paul France because the evidence was not relevant.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
To be relevant, evidence must have a tendency to make the existence of a fact of
consequence more or less probable, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD. v. Smith's Food
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& Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah
2000).
The probative value of evidence is determined on the basis of need and its ability to
make the existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. Ostler v. Albina Transfer
Co., Inc., supra; State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980). Where the evidence goes to an
issue which has already been decided, it must be excluded as irrelevant. Ostler, supra at 499.
In the present case, Dr. France said it was not probable that someone could be injured
in the accident. R. 321 at 136:11-23; 139:13-19; 141:7-142:1. However, he also admitted that
he was not a doctor. He said that leaves the question of whether there was, in fact, an injury
to the medical doctors. R.321 at 116:12-25; 117:1-7; 142:3-16; 148:7-17;154:2-6.
Before Dr. France testified, both doctors testified that Balderas was injured in the
January 1,2001 collision. Dr. France knew about this testimony, and said he does not dispute
Balderas was injured. R.321 at 148:19-149:8.
Therefore, his testimony that an injury in the accident was not "probable" could only
create confusion. After it is established that an injury occurred, the probability of its
happening is meaningless and confusing to a jury. Such testimony is only relevant and
material if the fact of an injury is at issue. After the medical experts agree that there was an
injury, the fact of injury is established and testimony on the probability of injury is
meaningless.
Defendants claim that the testimony of Dr. France was helpful to the jury in realizing
that there was only a minor impact in this case. The photographs of the damage to the
17

vehicles supported such a claim. The jury does not need expert testimony to tell them what
the photographs show. The speculations of Dr. France as to impact speeds add nothing as far
as establishing there was a low impact collision.
Clearly the testimony of Dr. France could only confuse the jury, and give counsel some
arguable basis for asking the jury not to award damages to Balderas. The testimony of Dr.
France was irrelevant. Its admission was prejudicial to Balderas. Its admission likely
influenced the jury to reduce the special damage award, and to only award nominal general
damages. Given the state of the evidence at the time Dr. France was called to testify, it was
plain error to allow him to give his irrelevant opinions.
CONCLUSION
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the Order of the Trial Court denying
Balderas' Motion for a New Trial and remand this matter back to the Trial Court with
instructions to grant Balderas Motion for a New Trial and to set the case for trial.
The Court should also instruct the Trial Court that upon remand, Balderas' Motion in
Limine regarding testimony of Dr. France should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of November, 2005.
Mel. S. Martin, P.C.
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,

Edward T. Wells
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Certificate of Delivery
I certify that on the 10th day of November, 2005,1 caused to be mailed by first class
mail, postage prepaid, two copies of Appellant's Reply Brief in the above matter to the
following:
David N. Mortensen
Ivie & Young
P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
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